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ARTICLES
E-DISCOVERY: REASONABLE
SEARCH, PROPORTIONALITY,
COOPERATION, AND ADVANCING
TECHNOLOGY
STEVEN C. BENNETT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 26(g)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Federal Rules”)1 requires that an attorney responding to a discovery request verify by signature, after “reasonable inquiry,” that the disclosure
is, to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, “complete and correct.” 2 In a
digital environment, with masses of data in multiple formats and locations,3 the determination of whether a “reasonable” effort to meet the
*
The author is a partner at Park Jensen Bennett LLP, and teaches E-Discovery
at New York Law School. The views expressed are solely those of the author, and should
not be attributed to the author's firm, or its clients.
1. This Article chiefly focuses on rules, developments, and cases at the federal level. For an overview of developments at the state level, see Thomas Y. Allman, State EDiscovery Today: An Assessment and Update of Rulemaking (Feb. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://works.bepress.com/thomas_allman/1/.
2. See Branhaven, LLC v. Beeftek, Inc., 288 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D. Md. 2013) (imposing sanctions for violation of Rule 26(g) and noting “counsel has an affirmative duty to
assure that their client responds completely and promptly to discovery requests”); St.
Paul Reins. Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (holding
Rule 26(g)(3) permits sanctions where counsel acts “without substantial justification,”
such that certification will provide a “deterrent” to evasion by attorneys to “stop and think
about the legitimacy of a discovery request”); see also Doyle v. Gonzales, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20158, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2011) (ordering additional e-discovery to proceed
until city certifies that its production is “complete and accurate”); Kay Beer Distrib. v.
Energy Brands, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130595, at *14 (E.D. Wis. June 10, 2009)
(holding an attorney signature constitutes certification of reasonable inquiry to assure
that response is complete and correct); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Serv. Co., 253 F.R.D.
354, 354 (D. Md. 2008) (holding Rule 26(g) certification is important element in discovery
process).
3. See John Gantz & David Reinsel, As The Economy Contracts, The Digital Uni-
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completeness requirement has occurred may turn on an assessment of
the practices used to conduct a search of electronic materials.4 Those
practices, in turn, must be judged on a standard of “proportionality”
(i.e., that the effort fits the size and needs of the case). As search technologies change, moreover, standards of reasonableness necessarily
must also change. Given the difficulty in achieving certainty as to the
adequacy of any particular search system, emphasis on cooperation and
agreement has become a rational method of proceeding. This Article
briefly reviews the impact of proportionality, cooperation, and technology on developing standards for “reasonable” search, and suggests practical steps for clients and counsel to prepare to defend the adequacy of
their search efforts.
II. REASONABLE SEARCH REQUIREMENT
The purpose of discovery, generally, is to facilitate efficient and just
dispute resolution.5 Balanced against that goal, however, is concern for
verse Expands
1, 3-4 (May 2009), http://www.emc.com/collateral/leadership/digitaluniverse/2009DU_final.pdf (study indicates that expansion of data volume is most significant factor increasing e-discovery costs); EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1, 1 (2010), available
at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf (factors associated with higher litigation costs include “electronic discovery requests from both sides” and
“disputes over electronic discovery”); see also GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL
EVIDENCE 3 (2008) (new technologies have “altered commerce, everyday communication,
government, public discourse—indeed almost everything,” including “civilization’s system
of writing”).
4. In large-volume cases especially, “completeness” of search may be something of
a misnomer. See Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“In large
data cases like this, involving over three million emails, no lawyer using any search
method could honestly certify that its production is ‘complete[.]’”). As Magistrate Judge
Facciola famously stated:
Whether search terms or ‘keywords’ will yield the information sought is a complicated question involving the interplay, at least, of the sciences of computer technology, statistics and linguistics. Given this complexity, for lawyers and judges to
dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce
information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to
tread.
United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008).
5. See, e.g., Basaldu v. Goodrich Corp., 2009 WL 1160915, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr.
29, 2009) (noting that the purpose of discovery is to “get all of the proverbial cards on the
table in advance of the trial”); Bd. of Regents of U. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., 2007 WL
3342423, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (“open and forthright” sharing of information required, “with the aim of expediting case progress, minimizing burden and expense and
removing contentiousness as much as practicable”). Discovery processes are thus meant
to comport with the overall goals of the civil litigation system. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the rules are to be interpreted to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination” of cases).
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undue burden and expense.6 Given these conflicting interests, courts do
not require “perfect” efforts to search for relevant electronically stored
information (“ESI”).7 Rather, the search must be “reasonable,” that is, a
search performed “competently, diligently and ethically.”8
6. Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) states that the court may limit discovery where “the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (stating that the party is not required
to produce information identified as “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost”); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c) (party serving subpoena must “take reasonable steps to
avoid” imposing undue burden or expense); see also St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12,
16 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the court has “broad discretion to tailor discovery,” including a “balancing of interests”); Duling v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 266 F.R.D. 66, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting need for “balancing” of interests of requesting and responding
parties); Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *28 (D.
Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) (stating “all discovery is subject to the balancing test”); Qwest Comm.
Int’l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003) (court has
“discretion, in the interests of justice, to prevent excessive or burdensome discovery”); see
generally JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, NICHOLAS M. PACE, & ROBERT H. ANDERSON, RAND INST.
FOR JUST., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY ix (2008),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP183.pdf
(noting that, “if not managed properly,” it is possible that the “sheer volume and complexity” of ESI can “increase litigation costs, impose new risks on lawyers and their clients,
and alter expectations about likely court outcomes”).
7. See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 306 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“[T]he standard for the production of ESI is not perfection.”); Moore, 287 F.R.D. at
191 (the Federal Rules “do not require perfection” in review); Lewis v. Sch. Dist. #70,
2006 WL 2506465, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2006) (even with the use of technology, “the
search would undoubtedly not be perfect”); Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that there is “no obligation” on the part of the responding party to
“examine every scrap of paper in its potentially voluminous files;” rather, responding party “must conduct a diligent search which involves developing a reasonably comprehensive
search strategy”); see also Ralph Losey, Predictive Coding Narrative: Searching For Relevance In the Ashes of Enron, E-DISCOVERY TEAM BLOG (Apr. 18, 2013), http://ediscoveryteam.com/2013/03/18/predictive-coding-narrative-searching-for-relevance-in-theashes-of-enron-restatement/ (“Perfection in legal search is never possible by anyone with
any software.”).
8.
See Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (the “reasonable inquiry”
requirement is met where the investigation undertaken is “reasonable under the circumstances;” it is an “objective standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11”); see generally
SEDONA CONF., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS &
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (2d ed. 2007); see also
In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 846 F. Supp.2d 1335, 1350 (N.D. Ga.
2012) (requiring “reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of [attorney’s] response, request or objection”); Zander v. Craig Hosp., 2011 WL 834190, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2011)
(requiring “timely, reasonable and diligent search”); Moore v. Napolitano, 723 F. Supp.2d
167, 173 (D.D.C. 2010) (party obligated to make a “reasonable search”); Nycomed U.S. Inc.
v. Glenmark Generics Ltd., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 820134, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010)
(obligation to conduct a “diligent search” requires “good faith on the part of the responding
party and its attorneys”); Fendi Adele v. Filene’s Basement, Inc., 2009 WL 855955, at *8
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Absent agreement of the parties, or specific order of the court, disputes about the adequacy of ESI searches almost inevitably arise. 9 In
that event, the requesting party may move to compel disclosure, 10 and
the responding party may move for a protective order.11
To date, courts have not identified “objective benchmarks [or]
standards” specific to the search process. 12 Complicating the absence of
a clear framework for measuring the adequacy of a search, questions of
proportionality and technological changes (addressed below) may require even more refined analysis of the burdens and benefits of (and alternatives to) any chosen search methodology. 13 Further, questions
arise as to how (and when) a court should evaluate the reasonableness
of search efforts.14 The risks of second-guessing, and difficulty in
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009) (litigants have obligation to “make reasonable efforts to locate
responsive documents”).
9. See EEOC v. McCormick & Schmick’s Seafood Rests., Inc., 2012 WL 380048, at
*4 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2012) (where producing party “generates the search terms on its own,
the inevitable result will be complaints that the terms were inadequate”); Covad Comm.
Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 5, 13 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that it is a “rare case that a
litigant does not allege some deficiency in the production” of ESI, “particularly e-mail”).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (party may move for an order “compelling disclosure,” but must include “a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure”).
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (responding party may move for protective order, but
must include a certification of “good faith” attempt to confer with requesting party); FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(c)(2) (if motion for protective order is denied, the court may “on just terms,
order that any party or person provide or permit discovery”).
12. See Sedona Conf., The Sedona Conference Commentary on Achieving Quality in
the e-Discovery Process, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 299, 315-16 (2009); see also ANNE KERSHAW
& JOE HOWIE, ELEC. DISCOVERY INST., JUDGES’ GUIDE TO COST-EFFECTIVE E-DISCOVERY
iii
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ediscoveryinstitute.org/publications/edis_judges_guide_to_cost-effective_ediscovery (noting that there are “probably more ways of gathering, processing and producing ESI than there are lawyers”).
13. See Michael D. Berman, Scott Fischer, & Richard E. Davis, Has Indexing Technology Made Zubulake Less Relevant?, ABA: TECHNOLOGY FOR THE LITIGATOR 1, 4 (Feb.
11,
2010),
available
at
http://www.esimediation.com/pdf/hasIndexingMadeZubulakeLessRelevant.pdf (technological improvements have made previously inaccessible information accessible, which “may change”
analysis related to “proportionality” and burden of retrieving “inaccessible” materials). Ediscovery technologies, moreover, come in a wide array of forms, with a wide array of features. See generally Ralph Losey, The Many Types of Legal Search Software in the CAR
Market
Today,
E-DISCOVERY
TEAM
BLOG
(Mar.
3,
2013),
http://ediscoveryteam.com/2013/03/03/the-many-types-of-legal-search-software-in-the-carmarket-today/ (describing “nine popular types of advanced search algorithms” currently
available); Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary
of Technology-Assisted Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (surveying technology
terms associated with various processes).
14. See Ralph Losey, CAR, E-DISCOVERY TEAM BLOG (Mar. 23, 2013), http://ediscoveryteam.com/car/ (suggesting a need for acceptance of “high margins of error” in
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proving reasonableness, further suggest that cooperation and agreement (where possible) must help determine the reasonableness of
search efforts.
III. PROPORTIONALITY
The Federal Rules, in various provisions, reference (although perhaps not directly), the need for “proportionality” in arranging ediscovery processes.15 Inherent in the balance between production of
information necessary for a fair search for truth, versus the burden and
cost of discovery, is a sense of “proportionality.” 16 That is, a “reasonable” search is reasonable not on some idealized notion of adequacy, but
“reasonable under the circumstances.” 17 Thus, in considering the “relevant circumstances” of a case, a court may need to review: “(i) the number and complexity of the issues; (ii) the location, nature, number and
availability of potentially relevant witnesses or documents; (iii) the extent of past working relationships between the attorney and the client,
particularly in related or similar litigation; and (iv) the time available
search, as “[even] if you do attain high recall in a large data set, you will never be able to
prove it”); see also Hon. Craig Shaffer, Defensible By What Standard?, 13 SEDONA CONF.
J. 212, 218 (2012) (“Designing and implementing a defensible discovery process, however,
is complicated by the post hoc nature of most discovery motions challenging the results.”).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26(b)(2)(B), 26(b)(2)(C), and 26(g); see generally Jesse A.
Schaefer & Betsy Cook Lanzen, Tick Tock: The Pendulum Swings Back to a World of Proportional Discovery, NAT. L. REV. (July 23, 2013), www.natlawreview.com (noting trend in
cases suggesting a “shift away from the liberal, all-you-can-eat discovery mindset back to
the more proportional, take-only-what-you-need practice”); see generally Sedona Conf.,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery,
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289 (2010); John Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary
Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Moody v. Turner Corp., Case No. 1:07-cv-692 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2010)
(availability of “vast amounts of electronic information can lead to a situation of the ESIdiscovery tail wagging the poor old merits-of-the-dispute dog”); Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP
A.G., 264 F.R.D. 541, 543-44 (N.D Cal. 2009) (case requires “cooperation in prioritizing
discovery” and awareness of “the proportionality requirement of [Rule] 26”); Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp.2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (the Federal Rules
require “reasonable efforts” and what is reasonable “depends on whether what was done—
or not done—was proportional to that case”); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Serv. Co., 253
F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Md. 2008) (the requirement of discovery “proportional to what is at
issue” is “clearly stated in Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii)”); see also DCP Midstream LP v. Anadarko
Petrol. Corp., 393 P.3d 1187, 1197 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 2013) (court must take “active role” in
managing discovery to assure “appropriate scope of discovery in light of the reasonable
needs of the case”); see generally Sedona Conf., supra note 15, at 301 (recognizing that use
of search technology to “quickly isolate essential information” may serve proportionality
by “creating efficiencies and cost savings,” and “reduce overall costs, better target discovery, protect privacy and confidentiality, and reduce burdens”).
17. See In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 846 F. Supp.2d 1335, 1350
(N.D. Ga. 2012).
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to conduct an investigation.”18 Such an assessment requires “more than
a mathematical count” of locations searched or documents retrieved. 19
Research, moreover, shows that search and review are the most expensive aspects of the e-discovery process.20 In theory, an estimate of
the cost of discovery, compared to the amount at issue in litigation,
could yield rough parameters for the scope of search and review21 and,
beyond certain limits,22 the producing party should not be required to
pay the costs of an exhaustive search. 23 Although rough parameters of
18. S2 Automation, LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120097, at
*99-100 (D.N.M. Aug. 9, 2012); see generally I-Med Pharma, Inc. v. Biomatrix, Inc., 2011
WL 6140658 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011); St. Paul Reins. Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198
F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
19. See Kleen Prods., LLC v. Pkg. Corp. of Am., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632, at
*46 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (“The selection of custodians must be designed to respond
fully to document requests and to produce responsive, nonduplicative documents during
the relevant period.”); Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“[W]here the line will be drawn as to review and production is going to depend on what
the statistics show for the results, since proportionality requires consideration of results
as well as costs.”).
20. See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR JUST., WHERE THE
MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY
1,
16
(2012),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf (corporate survey, finding seventy-three percent of costs attend to document search and review).
21. See Ralph Losey, Bottom Line Driven Proportional Review 1, 5 (2013),
http://ralphlosey.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/bottom_line_driven_review2.pdf (suggesting
that, with predictive coding and relevancy ranking, it is possible to set an amount of
search tailored to the amount at issue); but see George Socha, EDRM E-Discovery Budget
Calculators: Let’s Begin The Dialogue, LAW TECH. NEWS (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202630585259/EDRM-E-Discovery-BudgetCalculators%3A--Let's-Begin-the-Dialogue (“Independent research indicates significant
variability in ‘standards’ for estimating document and page counts;” it is “extremely challenging to provide accurate estimates until the mix of data is known . . . and this data
may not be available when initial estimates are provided”); David Degnan, Accounting for
the Costs of Electronic Discovery, 12 MINN. J.L.SCI. & TECH. 151, 169 (2011) (wide range in
assumptions regarding costs of e-discovery “create nightmare scenarios for those who
must plan a realistic litigation budget”).
22. The search for “all” relevant ESI is arguably counter-productive, given that
much information produced may provide little value in the dispute-resolution function.
See Victor Li, IT-Lex Conference: Predicting the Future of Predictive Coding, LAW TECH.
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2013) (“In e-discovery, only about 0.001 percent of [documents] even ends
up making the evidence list. It’s more important to find the hot docs than to chase down
all the relevant ones. We’re wasting money by chasing relevant—relevant is irrelevant.”)
(quoting Ralph Losey).
23. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67085, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. May 9, 2013) (refusing, on grounds of proportionality, to order “herculean effort” to
produce data that requesting party “is able to do without”); Wood v. Capital One Servs.,
LLC, 2011 WL 2154279, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011) (“rule of proportionality” required
denial of motion to compel, without prejudice to right to renew in event that requesting
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e-discovery cost estimates may exist, 24 precise budgeting for projects
may be elusive, especially at the outset of litigation. 25 Moreover, the
“transaction costs” of conducting even a fairly straightforward estimate
of costs,26 and the costs of negotiation with the opposing party, 27 may
party was “willing to underwrite the expense associated” with additional search); see also
Shaffer, supra note 14 (search quality standards require “reliable methodologies that provide a quality result at costs that are reasonable and proportionate to the particular circumstances of the client and the litigation”).
24. See Pace & Zakaras, supra note 20 (corporate survey finding cost of approximately $18,000 per gigabyte for “discovery” of information); Ann G. Fort, Rising Costs of
E-Discovery Requirements Impacting Litigants, LAW.COM (Mar. 20, 2007),
http://www.alm.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005554136 (estimating cost of $3 per email
for production in litigation).
25. See Doug Austin, Want to Estimate Your eDiscovery Budget? Use One of These
Calculators, E-DISCOVERY DAILY (Dec. 17, 2013), www.ediscoverydaily.com (“It can be difficult to estimate the total costs for eDiscovery at the outset of a case. There are a number of variables and options that could impact the budget by a wide margin and it may be
difficult to compare costs for various options for processing and review.”); Chris Dale, Establishing a Uniform Basis for eDiscovery Costs Projections, E-DISCLOSURE INFO. PROJECT
BLOG (Aug. 14, 2013) http://chrisdale.wordpress.com/2013/08/14/establishing-a-uniformbasis-for-ediscovery-costs-projections (noting “difficulty of making sensible prediction of
eDiscovery costs,” in part because “every provider of eDisclosure/eDiscovery software and
services has a different way of presenting the figures”); Interview by Metropolitan Corporate Counsel with Sophie Ross, Senior Managing Director, FTI Consulting, Inc. (Nov. 21,
2011),
available
at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/16672/two-prongedapproach-handling-e-discovery (noting difficulty in assessing e-discovery costs, because “ediscovery process is quite complex,” and large matters “typically have several providers
and several law firms involved as well as data moving back and forth, so the project management requirements are important”); Neetal Parekh, How to Budget for eDiscovery
Costs,
FINDLAW
(Sept.
25,
2009,
5:49
AM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2009/09/how-to-budget-for-ediscovery-costs.html (“At
early stages of a case, it often proves to be a challenge to consider the scope of discovery as
a whole—especially when trying to account for the looming variable of eDiscovery costs.”);
Conrad J. Jacoby, Using Technology To Estimate, Control And Manage Litigation Document
Review
Budgets,
METROPOLITAN
CORP.
COUNS.
(Sept.
1,
2009),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/11649/using-technology-estimate-control-andmanage-litigation-document-review-budgets (discovery budgets are “often set before the
parties finalize the scope of discovery, which can then grow far beyond early estimates”).
26. See Losey, supra note 21, at 7 n.13 (noting that advanced software for search
“comes with its own transactional costs, which means it cannot be economically used in
cases that are too ‘small’”); id. at 20 (“[C]omplex, big-ticket cases are the easiest to do ediscovery[.] If there is a billion dollars at issue, a reasonable budget for document review
is large. On the other hand, proportional e-discovery in small cases is a real challenge, no
matter how simple they supposedly are.”); see also Socha, supra note 21 (“Accurate budgeting and budget monitoring of the electronic data discovery effort, both at case initiation
and throughout any EDD project, is desired by many, achieved by few.”); Angela Hunt,
Why Attorneys Love-Hate Data Analytics, LAW TECH. NEWS (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1385754107570/Why-Attorneys-Love-Hate-DataAnalytics?slreturn=20140420095929 (use of “big data and performance metrics” can help
minimize legal spending, but lawyers “need some convincing”).
27. See William P. Butterfield, Conor R. Crowley, & Jeannine Kenney, Reality Bites:
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overwhelm the value of the case.28 The goal may be, more modestly, to
avoid gross over-use of resources, compared to the value of the case. 29
IV. COOPERATION
The practice of e-discovery differs markedly from the norms of information retrieval for other business and institutional purposes. 30 Ediscovery involves an “inherent asymmetry,” where the requesting party generally develops discovery requests without actual access to the information requested.31 E-discovery focuses on “fixed results sets,” rather than ranked retrieval, and emphasizes high rates of recall, as
contrasted with the high precision focus of most information users.32
Because of the adversarial nature of litigation, e-discovery generally
consists of arms-length,33 one-time transactions, rather than an
Why
TAR’s
Promises
have
yet
to
be
Fulfilled
1,
2-3
(2013),
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi5/additional/Butterfield.pdf (suggesting that “the
cost of extensive negotiations with the opposing party and ancillary litigation over the application of a TAR protocol in a given case will outweigh the cost-savings otherwise
achieved by the tool”).
28. A proportionality assessment, moreover, may be particularly difficult in the early stages of a case. See Theodore C. Hirt, The Quest for “Proportionality” in Electronic
Discovery—Moving from Theory to Reality in Civil Litigation, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 171, 192
(2011) (stating that the proportionality assessment is difficult where it is “impossible to
review the content of the requested information until it is produced”); Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery cannot be Optimal but could be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 889 (2009) (noting that the proportionality rules are difficult to apply where comparisons are required for discovery value and
cost, before parties actually gather evidence).
29. See, e.g., In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting
that the government agency spent $6 million, over nine percent of its annual budget, in
failed attempts to comply with subpoenas); Gabriel Techs. Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2013
WL 410103 (S.D. Cal. Feb.1, 2013) ($2.8 million to conduct initial classification of 1 million documents); In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig. 258 F.R.D. 280, 282 (D.
Del. 2008) (despite preservation effort involving 4,000 employee custodians and thousands
of backup tapes, “discovery remediation plan” was required).
30.
The American system of discovery also differs in kind from the civil law system
used in much of the rest of the world. See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO,
LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 131 (2006) (in contrast to civil law
systems, where a judge decides what evidence is needed, in the U.S., “it is the lawyers
who conduct pretrial discovery, albeit supervised in a general way by judges”).
31. See Douglas W. Oard & William Webber, Information Retrieval For E-Discovery,
7 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN INFO. RETRIEVAL 99, 106 (2013).
32. See Herbert Roitblat, Anne Kershaw & Patrick Oot, Document Categorization in
Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer Classification versus Manual Review, 61 J. AM. SOC.
FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 70, 71 (2010) (noting that discovery requests are generally “much
broader and more vague” than conventional requests for information).
33. See Butterfield, Crowley, & Kenney, supra note 27, at 4 (“parties in litigation
may have tactical, strategic, or ethical concerns that limit their willingness to fully coop-
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iterative and collaborative process meant to optimize results for the user within the constraints of the information system.34
Although the discovery process assumes the good faith of counsel, 35
e-discovery often devolves into a “go fish” approach to search 36 in which
discovery of defects in a search may be a matter of fortuitous revelation,
rather than the product of an organized system of quality control. 37 The
age of “big data,”38 moreover, has created an environment where human-only review may become essentially impossible 39 (and arguably
erate in a transparent manner”); Thomas Y. Allman, E-Discovery Standards in Federal
and State Courts after the 2006 Federal Amendments, ELEC. DISCOVERY L. 1, 32 (May 3,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/files/2013/11/2012FedStateEDiscoveryRulesMay3.pdf (stating that “parties are often unable, for tactical or practical reasons, to agree on preservation or discovery restrictions at an early stage”). “Lawyers trained in and committed to a
system governed by the adversary process are not conditioned to function effectively in
the pretrial environment envisioned by the Federal Rules.” William W. Schwarzer, The
Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 705
(1989).
34. See Oard & Webber, supra note 31, at 101, 112-15 (reviewing unique features of
e-discovery information retrieval tasks).
35. See Smith v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58261, at
*14-15 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2009) (“At bottom, the discovery process relies upon the good
faith and professional obligations of counsel to reasonably and diligently search for and
produce responsive documents.”).
36. See Hon. Andrew Peck, Search, Forward, LAW TECH. NEWS 25, 26 (Oct. 2011),
available at http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/TAR_conference/
Panel_1-Background_Paper.pdf (“[M]any counsel still use the ‘Go Fish’ model of keyword
search[.]”).
37. See Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72953, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) (party “fortuitously” discovered existence of responsive documents, not produced, even as opposing counsel “persisted in belittling” concerns about production as “paranoia and harassment”) (quotation omitted).
38. See John M. Barkett, More on the Ethics of E-Discovery: Predictive Coding And
Other
Forms
of
Computer-Assisted
Review
30
(2012),
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/TAR_conference/Panel_5Original_Paper.pdf (“Large numbers here are not hundreds or thousands of documents,
but hundreds of thousands and millions of documents.”).
39.
See Manfred Gabriel, Chris Paskach, & David Sharpe, The Challenge And
Promise
of
Predictive
Coding
for
Privilege
1,
1
(June
14,
2013),
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi5/research/Gabriel-final2.pdf (noting that attorney
review of documents makes up nearly three-quarters of e-discovery costs). One common
problem is the variety of formats in which information may appear. See Ned AverillSnell, How Document Viewing is Key to Effective eDiscovery in the Legal Market, WIRED
(Nov. 15, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/how-document-viewingis-key-to-effective-ediscovery-in-the-legal#axzz32GXYTCK7 (noting that “dozens” of document formats means that legal teams “must stock a complex and often expensive array
of programs for viewing,” and also be trained in using them; switching between formats
“wastes costly time and increases the risk of error”); see also Pace & Zakaras, supra note
20 (indicating that research also suggests that the best review speed, using human reviewers, may be in the range of 100 documents per hour; at that rate, e-discovery costs
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inadequate,40 compared to machine-plus-human review).41
In response, many judges, often referencing The Sedona Conference
Cooperation Proclamation,42 have suggested a need for “transparency”
may be quite difficult to control); see Sedona Conf. WGI, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in e-Discovery,
8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 194 (2007) (“In many settings involving [ESI], reliance solely on a
manual search process for the purpose of finding responsive documents may be infeasible
or unwarranted.”).
40. See Butterfield, Crowley, & Kenney, supra note 27, at 1 (noting that it is “well
recognized” that “human, manual review is not only entirely impractical in the age of ESI,
but is also far from the ‘gold standard’ of review against which other search tools should
be judged”); Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in eDiscovery can be More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J. L. & TECH.
11, 12 (2011); Patrick Oot, Anne Kershaw, & Herbert L. Roitblat, Mandating Reasonableness in a Reasonable Inquiry, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 533, 551 (2010) (“Human review is of
unknown accuracy and consistency.”); but see Ralph Losey, Electronic Discovery Best Practices (Oct. 27, 2012), www.edbp.com (“Despite the many well-known limitations of manual
review and key word search, these search methods still have a place in multimodal review.”). Agreement rates between human reviewers may fall in the range of about fifty
percent (the equivalent of a coin flip). See Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack,
Inconsistent Responsiveness Determination in Document Review: Difference of Opinion or
Human Error?, 32 PACE L. REV. 267, 267 (2012) (TREC study suggests that “disagreements among assessors are largely attributable to human error”); William Webber, Reexamining the Effectiveness of Manual Review 1-8 (2011), available at
http://www.williamwebber.com/research/papers/w11sire.pdf (noting that there is “greatly
varying quality of reviewers” within review teams, suggesting a “lack of process control,”
and that “an automated method of production can be as reliable a means” as “full manual
review”); Herbert Roitblat, The Process of Electronic Discovery 1, 2 (2010), available at
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi-ws/papers/roitblat.doc (“Various studies have
found that assessors do not often agree among themselves as to which documents are relevant.”).
41. Humans remain essential to the review process, even in a machine-dominated
environment. See Monica Bay, EDI-Oracle Study: Humans are still Essential in eDiscover,
LAW
TECH.
NEWS
(Nov.
20,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202628778400/EDI-Oracle-Study%3A-HumansAre-Still-Essential-in-E-Discovery (study suggests that “software is only as good as its
operators,” and “spending more money [on review] does not correlate with greater quality”); Ralph Losey, Legal Search Science, E-DISCOVERY TEAM BLOG (Nov. 17, 2013),
http://e-discoveryteam.com/2013/11/17/legal-search-science/ (suggesting need for “multimodal” search through “hybrid human computer information retrieval;” in this system
“the expert reviewer remains in control of the process, and their expertise is leveraged [by
machine] for greater accuracy and speed”); Oot, Kershaw, & Roitblat, supra note 40 (“All
categorization systems require some level of education interaction. Better results occur
when knowledge is transferred early and continuously throughout the process.”); see also
Robert Rohlf, Rebuttal: EDRM Is A Model Of Collaboration In Action, LAW TECH. NEWS
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202632479582/Rebuttal%3AEDRM-Is-a-Model-of-Collaboration-in-Action (“In spite of new technologies enabling cost
reduction and short-cuts at different stages of [e-discovery], nothing has eliminated these
basic steps as a necessity.”).
42. See Sedona Conf. WGI, supra note 39. For a list of judges (and citations to numerous opinions) adopting the Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, see
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(or at least “translucency”) in the e-discovery process, aimed at partyagreed protocols for the conduct of e-discovery.43 But the precise degree
of required clarity (or, conversely, permissible opacity) in sharing information about the e-discovery process is disputed in the case law.44
On one view, “it is impossible to evaluate the adequacy of an electronic
search for records without knowing what search terms have been used,”
and “the precise instructions that custodians give their computers are
crucial.”45 On another view, the details of counsel’s advice and
www.thesedonaconference.org.
43. See, e.g., Saliga v. Chemtura Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167019, at *3 (D.
Conn. Nov. 25, 2013) (“the best solution in the entire area of electronic discovery is cooperation among counsel;” declining to order defendant to provide plaintiff with specific information regarding “data collection process,” and instead directing parties to resolve disputes through “cooperation”); In re Porsche, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136954, at *22-3 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 24, 2012) (“Transparency in the discovery process is necessary to ensure that all
relevant information is made available to the litigants[.] . . . Full disclosure of Defendants’
efforts in collecting responsive documents will illuminate this issue so that the parties can
resolve it.”); Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“An
important aspect of cooperation is transparency in the discovery process.”); Cartel Asset
Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *40 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010)
(“This Court has endorsed [the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation] and its call for cooperative, collaborative and transparent discovery.”) (quotation omitted); DeGeer v. Gillis, 755
F. Supp.2d 909, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“proper and most efficient” course is agreement as to
“search terms and data custodians” prior to document retrieval); Mancia v. Mayflower,
Inc., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (D. Md. 2008) (“compliance with the ‘spirit and purposes’ of
the discovery rules requires cooperation by counsel to identify and fulfill legitimate discovery needs, yet avoid seeking discovery the cost and burden of which is disproportionately large to what is at stake”); U. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., 2007 WL 3342423, at *5 (D.
Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (“The overriding theme of recent amendments to the discovery rules
has been open and forthright sharing of information by all parties to a case with the aim
of expediting case progress, minimizing burden and expense, and removing contentiousness as much as practicable.”); Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29265, at *15 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (directing counsel to be prepared to discuss
search protocol and creation of keyword list); see generally Oot, Kershaw, & Roitblat, supra note 40 (“Litigants should consider cooperation with an opponent early to establish a
search protocol.”); Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery after the Amendments: The
Second Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 215, 216 (2009) (courts “expect parties to reach practical agreements on search terms, date ranges, key players and the like”).
44. There is a case to be made for cooperation, independent of the dictates of courts
and rule-makers. See Craig Ball, Cooperation in Practice: Georgetown Institute 2013,
BALL
IN
YOUR
CT.
BLOG
(Nov.
20,
2013),
http://ballinyourcourt.wordpress.com/2013/11/20/cooperation-in-practice-georgetowninstitute-2013/ (“[W]e don’t cooperate and promote transparency to help the other side.
We do it because of the genuine and significant benefits it affords to our side. It allows us
to move forward with greater safety and certainty, conserves money and time and forestalls misdirected effort.”); see also Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts on “Information Inflation” and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, 17
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 28-29 (2011) (suggesting that “serious ethical issues” may arise from
failure of parties to cooperate in e-discovery search process).
45. Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
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instructions regarding discovery processes are privileged, and parties
are not required to prove the adequacy of their efforts until at least
some showing of incompleteness appears in the record.46 Yet, a
Agency, 877 F. Supp.2d 87, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Am. Home Assurance Co. v.
Greater Omaha Packing Co., 2013 WL 4875997, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2013) (discussing
that a party must provide the requesting party “adequate opportunity to contest” the adequacy of discovery and ordering the producing party to “disclose the sources it has
searched or intends to search and, for each source, the search terms used”); Apple, Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67085, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2013) (requiring identification of search terms and custodians by subpoena respondent, for purposes of
“evaluating the adequacy” of respondent’s search for records); FormFactor, Inc. v. MicroProbe, Inc., 2012 WL 1575093, at *7 n.4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (citing cases for proposition that search terms are not work product); In re Enforcement of Subpoena issued by
FDIC, 2011 WL 2559546, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2011) (holding search terms “fact”
work product, subject only to “qualified protection”); Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271
F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that document production information, including
search terms, is not within work product protection); SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256
F.R.D. 403, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that attorney’s assessment of relevance of potentially responsive documents is not “core” work product); Smith v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of
Am., 2009 WL 2045197, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2009) (rejecting work product protection
for search terms used by counsel in conducting discovery); Craig Ball, Transparency of
Process No Peril to Work Product, BALL IN YOUR CT. BLOG (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://ballinyourcourt.wordpress.com/2013/12/16/transparency-of-process-no-peril-towork-product/ (“No one suggests that the searches a lawyer runs to test theories and form
mental impressions are per se discoverable. How a lawyer serves to inform his or her own
assessment of the case may be protected. But that’s a different kettle of fish from the use
of search terms to objectively filter collections for review and production[.]”).
46. See S2 Automation LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120097, at
*38 (D.N.M. Aug. 9, 2012) (where party certifies that it has “produced all responsive documents, there is little more the Court can do now to require them to produce documents,
unless further discovery reveals that the search was inadequate”); In re Cathode Ray
Tube Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120218, at *34-35 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011)
(“Plaintiffs ask [defendant] to disclose the search terminology which [defendant] used to
search for and examine relevant documents. . . . While desirable, such joint development
is not a legal requirement in this case.”); Moore v. Napolitano, 723 F. Supp.2d 167, 172-73
(D.D.C. 2010) (holding that there is no burden on producing party to show adequacy of
efforts, unless requesting party discovers some “flaw” in the production); Benson v. St.
Joseph Reg’l Health Ctr., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28795, at *14 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2006) (“It
is unnecessary for Defendants to explain the details of their method of searching when
they have certified and represented to the Court that they have complied fully with Plaintiffs’ requests.”); see also H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, No Disclosure: Why
Search Terms are Worthy of Court’s Protection, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202630205785/No-Disclosure:-Why-SearchTerms-Are-Worthy-of-Court's-Protection?slreturn=20140420110723
(suggesting
that
court-compelled disclosure of search terms constitutes a “dangerous dance on the edge of
violating work product protection;” search process necessarily involves the lawyer “developing (and redeveloping) a theory of the case”); see generally Sean Grammel, Protecting
Search Terms as Opinion Work Product: Applying the Work Product Doctrine to Electronic
Discovery, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 2063 (2013) (surveying cases); Ralph Losey, Keywords
and Search Methods should be Disclosed, but not Irrelevant Documents, E-DISCOVERY
TEAM BLOG (May 26, 2013), http://e-discoveryteam.com/2013/05/26/keywords-and-search-
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completely “black box” form of production risks inefficiency and unfairness.47
Even if full transparency cannot be achieved, the Federal Rules repeatedly recognize a requirement of “good faith” discovery negotiation
between parties.48 That negotiation requirement, at least, may mean
that the requesting party and the producing party must confer on potential search terms.49 Negotiation alone, however, cannot assure a
trouble-free process.50
V. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES
In a world of paper records (not so long ago), review of documents
for production in discovery, by hand, was the norm. Today, researchers
question the underlying assumption that human review, alone, suffices
to assure quality in any document production.51 In larger scale cases,
methods-should-be-disclosed-but-not-irrelevant-documents/ (suggesting a need for “sharing process, not documents” in planning e-discovery); see generally David J. Kessler, Robert D. Owen, & Emily Johnston, Search Terms are More Than Mere Words, N.Y. L. J.,
Mar. 21, 2011.
47. See EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35195, at *51-52
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (rejecting party’s unilateral relevance determinations); Novelty,
Inc. v. Mountain View Mktg., Inc., 265 F.R.D. 370, 376 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“Unilaterally deciding to conduct a cursory initial search to be followed by ‘rolling’ productions from subsequent, more thorough, searches is not an acceptable option.”); but see Treppel v. Biovail
Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing the situation where a plaintiff declined to discuss search scope and keyword terms, the defendant “should have proceeded
unilaterally, producing all responsive documents located by its search”).
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (providing sanctions for party or counsel who “does not
participate in good faith” in pretrial conference, or is “substantially unprepared to participate”); id. at 26(c)(1) (requiring party moving for protective order to certify “good faith”
effort to confer “in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action”); id. at 26(f) (counsel and unrepresented parties responsible for “attempting in good faith to agree on the
proposed discovery plan”); id. at 37(a) (requiring party moving to compel to certify “good
faith” effort “to obtain [disclosure] without court action”); see generally Jason Baron &
Edward Wolfe, A Nutshell on Negotiating E-Discovery Search Protocols, 11 SEDONA CONF.
J. 229 (2010).
49. See, e.g., In re Facebook PPC Advert. Litig., 2011 WL 1324516, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 6, 2011) (requiring parties to negotiate regarding search terms); Romero, 271 F.R.D.
at 109 (same); Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92603, at *15
(D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2010) (same).
50. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 226, 246 (M.D.N.C.
2010) (noting “continued wrangling” that may ensue where parties give “vague assurance”
of steps to be taken, which “frequently derails the discovery process”).
51. Research shows inconsistency in human review. See Maura R. Grossman &
Gordon V. Cormack, Inconsistent Assessment of Responsiveness in E-Discovery: Difference
of
Opinion
or
Human
Error?
1,
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi4/papers/grossman2.pdf (“It is well known that any
two reviewers will often disagree as to the responsiveness of particular documents; that
is, one will code a document as responsive, while the other will code the same document
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moreover, all-human review has essentially become impossible. 52
Keyword searching alone may also suffer from significant problems.53
Technological advances have thus both pulled and pushed the standard
of reasonableness in search toward use of “computer assisted” review. 54
The legal search technology market, however, has not fully matured. 55
E-discovery differs from conventional information retrieval. In the
typical e-discovery project, the starting point for a search requires consideration of the appropriate scope of data custodians, time frames, and
search terms.56 Despite vast improvements in software used for
search,57 including “predictive coding,”58 the up-front work of planning
as non-responsive;” “vast majority of cases of disagreement are a product of human error
rather than documents that fall in some ‘gray area’ of responsiveness”); Ellen M. Voorhees, Variations in Relevance Judgments and the Measurement of Retrieval Effectiveness,
36 INFO. PROC. & MGMT. 697, 697 (2000) (noting “substantial differences in relevance
judgments” among human reviewers).
52. See Gregory L. Fordham, Using Keyword Search Terms in E-Discovery and How
They Relate to Responsiveness, Privilege, Evidence Standards and Rube Goldberg, 15
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 10 (2009) (given volumes of digital information, “it is simply not
practical to take a ‘boots on the ground’ approach” to document review; “the weak link in
the chain is often the human element”); see also Baron, supra note 44 (noting that large
document collections in litigation can now run into “billions” of pages).
53. See William P. Butterfield, Conor R. Crowley, & Melinda R. Coolidge, Diving
Deeper
to
Catch
Bigger
Fish
1,
5
(2009),
available
at
http://www.law.pitt.edu/DESI3_Workshop/Papers/DESI_III.ButterfieldCrowley.pdf (keyword searching alone may be “over-inclusive” or “under-inclusive;” thus, “both the precision and recall of searches for relevant information can be adversely affected when
searches rely on keywords”).
54. See Amor A. Esteban, The Evolution and Integration of E-Discovery, 1 PRAC.
LAW. 24, 25 (2013) (“Technology has not remained static . . . and each new advancement
adds to the growing complexity of managing and understanding the related legal challenges.”).
55. See David Horrigan & Alan Pelz-Sharpe, Abandoning the EDRM Assembly Line:
A Legal-Regulatory Technology Market Ripe for Change, 451 RESEARCH (Oct. 23, 2013),
https://451research.com/report-short?entityId=79081&referrer=marketing
(suggesting
that “legal sector is served poorly,” as available technology is “difficult to use, dated, proprietary in nature and designed poorly;” marketplace is “flooded with tiny and poorly
funded vendors” that do not have the ability to “scale their operations” and “legal buyers
are slow to come to a decision” and “very conservative” and “penny-pinching”).
56. See, e.g., Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency, 877 F. Supp.2d 87, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that failure to search
files of former employees made search inadequate). “[I]n order to determine adequacy, it
is not enough to know the search terms. The method in which they are combined and deployed is central to the inquiry.” Id.; In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 846
F. Supp.2d 2d 1335, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (determining that search was inadequate due to
failure to collect back-up tapes and process hard drives); Moore v. Napolitano, 723 F.
Supp.2d 167, 173 (D.D.C. 2010) (limiting search to three specific Secret Service divisions).
57. See generally Ralph Losey, Secrets of Search, E-DISCOVERY TEAM BLOG (Dec. 11,
2011), http://e-discoveryteam.com/2011/12/11/secrets-of-search-part-one/ (three-part series
on advances in e-discovery search technologies and practices).
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an e-discovery project remains the most important part of the function.59 Ironically, reduced cost of information storage has increased the
cost and complexity of effective search,60 as information now appears in
58. See R.T. Oehrle & E.A. Johnson, The Structure Of Predictive Coding: A Guide
for
the
Perplexed
1,
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi5/additional/Oehrle-final.pdf (suggesting that predictive coding is a “response to the convergence of dynamic market forces,” including a
“skyrocket” in volume, and “downward” trending in estimates of the quality of human linear review). To date, however, predictive coding techniques have not been shown to work
efficiently in lower cost, lower volume cases. See John C. Eustice, Using Technology Assisted Review in the Right Cases and in the Right Way, INSIDE COUNS. (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/11/14/using-technology-assisted-review-in-the-rightcase (discussing that technology assisted review is particularly valuable for “cases involving high financial stakes, large volumes of mostly textual electronic data (such as e-mail),
and short discovery periods”). The “black box” nature of predictive coding, moreover, for
most lawyers and clients, may constitute an impediment to widespread acceptance of advanced technology. See R. Eric Hutz, E-Discovery: Using Predictive Coding to Manage EDiscovery
Costs
and
Risks,
INSIDE
COUNS.
(Feb.
23,
2012),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/02/23/e-discovery-using-predictive-coding-to-managee-di (noting that many view predictive coding as a “black box” process, using complex algorithms “not easily understood or explainable by anyone other than a computer scientist”); see also Jason R. Baron & Jesse B. Freeman, Cooperation, Transparency, and the
Rise of Support Vector Machines in E-Discovery: Issues Raised by the Need to Classify
Documents as Either Responsive or Nonresponsive 1, 6 (May 26, 2013), available at
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi5/additional/Baron-Jason-final.pdf (providing a
“look under the hood” at the algorithms and processes of predictive coding).
59. See Vanessa Lloyd, What Infinite E-discovery Searches Need is a Reboot, Not
Kumbaya,
CORP.
COUNS.
ADVISORY
(July
17,
2013),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2
013/07/17/what-infinite-e-discovery-searches-need-is-a-reboot-not-kumbaya.aspx (noting
“too much emphasis on the tools and technology;” more important is “having the proper
people and the workflows in place to help guide and manage the e-discovery process”). “In
reality, people are more important to the review process than ever when using technologyassisted review. Because reviewers need to make determinations up-front and interact
with the technology, the quality of the review is only as good as the quality of the reviewer.” Barry Murphy, 2012: The Year of Technology-Assisted Review in eDiscovery, FORBES
(Jan. 17, 2012, 2:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/barrymurphy/2012/01/17/2012-theyear-of-technology-assisted-review-in-ediscovery/. “Fundamentally, the focus always has
been—and remains—methodology.” Amanda Jones & Ben Kerschberg, What TechnologyAssisted Electronic Discovery teaches Us about the Role of Humans in Technology, FORBES
(Jan. 9, 2012, 10:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2012/01/09/whattechnology-assisted-electronic-discovery-teaches-us-about-the-role-of-humans-intechnology/. “None of this technology solves the problem on its own. It needs a brain, and
a legally trained brain at that[.]” Chris Dale, Having the Acuity to Determine Relevance
with Predictive Coding, CHRIS DALE BLOG (Oct. 15, 2010), www.chrisdale.wordpress.com.
60. See generally Cody Bennett, A Perfect Storm for Pessimism: Converging Technologies,
Cost
and
Standardization
(2011),
available
at
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi4/papers/bennett.pdf. “The amount of information
will grow vastly while storage costs become subdued, increasing the need for computational technologies to offset the very large costs associated with knowledge workers. This
paradigm shift signals a mandatory call for smarter information systems, both automated
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multiple formats and locations, and subject to the control of multiple
custodians.61 Negotiations (and litigation) between parties over the
conduct of search can greatly add to the cost of e-discovery.62 Institutions often follow a “hodgepodge” of information management procedures, adapted to an array of diverse functions. 63 These challenges,
moreover, are highly individualized, such that no single information retrieval system can be called “standard” or “best.”64
VI. SUGGESTED PRACTICES
In recent years, a host of new e-discovery related local rules and
model orders have been suggested from various quarters.65 Many of
these procedures may offer valuable solutions to long-standing ediscovery search issues.66 Proposed changes to the Federal Rules of
and semi-automated.” Id. at 1; see also TRANSMITTAL OF RULES TO CONGRESS, 234 F.R.D.
219, 272 (2006) (report of the Advisory Committee) (noting “exponentially greater volume”
of digital material, versus “hard-copy,” with information that is “dynamic” and “incomprehensible when separated from the system that created it”).
61. See Charles R. Ragan, Information Governance: It’s a Duty and It’s Smart Business, 19 RICHMOND J. L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2013) (noting requirement of “federated” search,
and tendency of organizations to store information past its useful life); id. at 12-19 (noting
additional challenges).
62. EORHB, Inc. v. HOA Holdings, LLC, 2013 WL 1960621 (Del. Chanc. May 6,
2013) (discussing that given the “low volume of relevant documents,” the cost of using
predictive coding would not “likely be outweighed by any practical benefit of its use;” thus,
parties “may conduct document review using traditional methods”).
63. See Ragan, supra note 61, at 25-26 (noting information security, protection of
proprietary information, disaster recovery, and many other potential institutional goals).
64. See id. at 20 (“[T]he strategies one organization may choose to follow, and the
acceptance or mitigation of particular information-related risks, will differ from the next,
depending on each organization’s business objectives, specific legal obligations and its tolerance for risk.”).
65. See Thomas Y. Allman, Local Rules, Standing Orders, and Model Protocols:
Where the Rubber Meets the (E-Discovery) Road, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 47 (2013) (noting
“healthy proliferation of local e-discovery initiatives” without an “obvious pattern emerging as the dominant approach”).
66. A Model Order for patent cases, for example, has been proposed and implemented (with some success) in recent cases. See Fed. Cir. Bar Assoc., An E-Discovery Model
Order, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 347 (2012) (model order includes presumptive limits on discovery
requests, with cost-shifting for requests in excess of presumption); Edward Reines & Ping
Gu, Reducing the Cost of Patent Litigation, RECORDER, Aug. 20, 2012, at 20, available at
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca/TR_Litigation_082012.pdf (model order assumes that litigants “would tend to expend their own resources more carefully than they would an adversary’s resources”); see also Steven R. Trybus & Sara Tonnies Horton, A Model Order
Regarding E-Discovery in Patent (and Other?) Cases, 20 A.B.A. PRETRIAL PRAC. & DISCOV.
2, 4 (2012) (suggesting that cost-shifting and other provisions of patent bar model order
could be “applied to other types” of complex litigation); Wendy Akbar, “One Ring to Rule
Them All?” E-Discovery Search Methodology in Patent Litigation in Light of Recent Model
Orders and Case Law, ELEC. DISCOVERY (July 2, 2012), http://electronicdiscovery.info/one-
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Civil Procedure,67 particularly those focused on cooperation and proportionality, may also do some good.68 But for practitioners and their clients, in the main, no “magic” remedy seems likely to appear any time
soon.69 Despite the challenges associated with defining a “reasonable”
ring-to-rule-them-all-e-discovery-search-methodology-in-patent-litigation-in-light-ofrecent-model-orders-and-case-law-electronic-discovery/; John Tredennick, New Model EDiscovery Order for Patent Cases turns Fishing Expeditions into Games of “Go Fish,”
CATALYST SECURE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/2011/10/newmodel-e-discovery-order-for-patent-cases-turns-fishing-expeditions-into-games-of-go-fish/
(suggesting that the Model Order could have “far-reaching implications” for patent disputes and other civil cases). At least one court has suggested that the Model Order may
place a check on incentives in “assymetrical” litigation. See DCG Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint
Tech., LLC, 2011 WL 5244356, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (suggesting the need for “experimentation” to address “a largely unchecked problem” in e-discovery); In re Google
Litig., 2011 WL 611300, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2011) (objective of the Model Order is
“scaling the burden of electronic document production to its legitimate benefit”). For another sample form of the order, see Ralph Losey, Judge Grimm’s New Discovery Order is
Now an e-Discovery Best Practice—Part One, E-DISCOVERY TEAM BLOG (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://e-discoveryteam.com/2013/11/03/judge-grimms-new-discovery-order-is-now-an-ediscovery-best-practice-part-two-with-postscript-to-vendors-on-legal-software-of-thefuture/ (referencing Discovery Order, Chambers of Hon. Paul W. Grimm, District of Maryland, text available at www.iaals.du.edu/library/publications/model-e-discovery-order).
67. See Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past the Debate: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 178, 179 (2013) (overview of proposed Rules changes); Thomas Y. Allman, Rules Committee Adopts “Package”
of Discovery Amendments, 13 BNA DIG. DISC. & E-EVID. 200, 201 (2013). For the text of
the revised Federal Rules, and comments on the proposed revisions, see NOTICE OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND OPEN HEARINGS, USC-Rules-2013-00-0002/.
68. See Kevin F. Meade & Arielle Gordon, Questions Raised by Proposed Amendments
to
Federal
Rules,
N.Y.
L.J.
(Dec.
2,
2013),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202629954493/Questions-Raised-by-ProposedAmendments-to-Federal-Rules (suggesting that “true impact” of proposed changes may
not be felt until rules are interpreted by courts); Todd Ruger, Discovery Rules Changes
Greeted
with
Skepticism
in
Senate,
NAT’L
L.J.
(Nov.
6,
2013),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202626625047/Discovery-Rules-ChangesGreeted-With-Skepticism-in-Senate%0D%0A (noting “controversy” over proposed rule
changes, which could allegedly “harm plaintiffs” in discrimination cases and “do nothing
about the high-stakes, highly complex or highly contentious cases in which discovery costs
are a problem”); see also David Horrigan, Kroll Ontrack Recaps E-Discovery 2013 with a
Google+
Hangout,
LAW
TECH.
NEWS
(Dec.
12,
2013),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202632092502/Kroll-Ontrack-Recaps-EDiscovery-2013-With-a-Google%2B-Hangout (e-discovery experts agree that “rule changes
would accomplish little without fundamental changes in the legal traditions that govern
e-discovery just as much as the rules do”); Mitchell Dembin & Philip Favro, Changing
Discovery Culture One Step at a Time, LAW TECH. NEWS (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202630168239/Changing-Discovery-Culture-OneStep-at-a-Time (rejecting “Pollyannaish view” that proposed Rules changes will “cure the
present ills afflicting discovery”).
69. See Jason Krause, Predictive Coding Wars: Man or Machine?, DISCOVERY
CLOUD
BLOG
(Dec.
17,
2013),
http://www.discoverycloud.nextpoint.com/2013/12/11/predictive-coding-wars-man-
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search methodology, lawyers and their clients must satisfy judicial expectations regarding search efforts in litigation, and attune their efforts
accordingly.70 The list below, largely derived from extant opinions
touching on search issues, outlines at least a “starter set” of basic principles.
A. EDUCATION
The era of “mutually assured destruction” in e-discovery is over.71
Today, in virtually every case, e-discovery is discovery.72
machine/. Mr. Krause states:
Though there is no magic bullet or simple technological answer to this problem,
there is hope. During the last half-decade of research . . . we have [developed] a
much better understanding of what a good “search process” looks like. That includes a “human in the loop” (known in the Legal Track as a “topic authority”)
evaluating on an ongoing basis what automated search software kicks out by way
of results. Id.
70. See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., Rose Hunter Jones, & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions
for e-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 803 (2010) (in review of five
years of sanction opinions, failure to produce information most common basis for sanctions); see also Sue Reisinger, Kroll Study Sees Dramatic Drop in e-Discovery Sanctions,
LAW TECH. NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://www.krollontrack.com/publications/EDiscoverySanctions.pdf (noting that the “learning curve” for management of e-discovery
cases is evident in decline in sanctions, but “procedural disputes” over “search protocols”
and cooperation remain a concern).
71. In the early days of the Internet (and e-mail), counsel and clients often held off
on demanding electronic information, on the theory that both sides could overwhelm the
other with such requests. See Ralph E. Losey, Top Trends in e-Discovery Noted at ILTA
Conference, ATKINSON-BAKER CT. REPS. (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.depo.com/Eletters/TheDiscoveryUpdate/1107/Articles/TopTrends.html. Losey states:
The [ILTA] panel thinks that corporate America is finally starting to get it, and
recognize[s] that they must get a better handle on their records, and be prepared
for e-discovery. They correctly noted that for many years most large organizations have taken a kind of “ostrich” approach to the looming problem, and tried to
ignore the disastrous law suits that happen to other companies. Consistent with
that policy of denial and avoidance, they have instructed their legal counsel to
adopt what the panel called “don’t ask, don’t tell” agreements with opposing
counsel. This has worked in the past when two large companies were suing each
other, and is usually referred to as the “MAD” approach, “Mutually Assured Destruction,” and e-discovery is the nuclear weapon that both sides informally agree
not to use. If one company did dare to drop a bomb of an e-discovery request, the
other would respond in kind. It kept the peace for many years, but is now as passé as the cold war itself. Id.
72. See Deborah Jillson, Harnessing the Beast: Litigation Readiness for Big Data,
LAW
TECH.
NEWS
(Dec.
17,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202632455434/Harnessing-the-Beast%3ALitigation-Readiness-for-Big-Data (stating that “paper-based litigation practices and discovery have disappeared and electronic discovery is here to stay”); Megan Zavieh, Luddite
Lawyers are Ethical Violations Waiting to Happen, LAWYERIST (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://lawyerist.com/71071/luddite-lawyers-ethical-violations-waiting-happen/
(noting
that, today, “even litigation between individuals represented by solo attorneys is likely to
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Attorneys must educate themselves about the fundamentals of ediscovery technology,73 and inform themselves about their client’s “key
players,”74 information management environment,75 the capabilities of
available service providers,76 and the search requirements of the

involve electronic discovery”); see also Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory,
and Precedent: Finding the Right Pond, Lure, and Lines Without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56 S.D. L. REV. 25, 26 (2011) (“electronic communication and processing has taken a dominant role in business and personal relationship worldwide”); Moss, supra note
28, at 892 (noting key importance of e-discovery in litigation today).
73. See Mikki Tomlinson, Attacking eDiscovery Ignorance in 2013, E-DISCOVERY J.
(Nov. 29, 2012, 9:22 AM), http://old.ediscoveryjournal.com/2012/11/attacking-ediscoveryignorance-in-2013/ (suggesting that poor cooperation efforts in e-discovery “oftentimes
boils down to eDiscovery ignorance”); Allman, supra note 33, at 7 (“Counsel has an ethical
obligation to acquire the requisite skills and knowledge to advise on e-discovery, confidentiality of client information and privilege reviews, and the maintenance of an appropriate
relationship with courts and counsel while balancing cooperation and advocacy.”); see also
Joel Cohen & James L. Bernard, The “Ethic” of Getting up to Speed “Technologically,”
N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202631612989/The'Ethic'-of-Getting-Up-to-Speed-'Technologically' (“like it or not, an understanding of technology is ethically required”); Oot, Kershaw, & Roitblat, supra note 40, at 535 (noting
need to “encourage attorneys to learn and study technology” and “help [attorneys] better
understand their options for meeting discovery obligations in litigation”); Sedona Conf.
WGI, supra note 39, at 195 (“Parties and courts should be alert to new and evolving
search and information retrieval methods.”). The ABA’s recent modifications to its Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility emphasize the point. See AMER. BAR ASS’N MODEL
RULE 1.1, Comment 8 (2012) (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer
should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and
risks associated with relevant technology[.]”).
74. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting obligation of counsel to identify “key players” and communicate with them “to understand
how they stored information” relevant to proceedings); see also Mafe Rajul, “I Didn’t Know
My Client Wasn’t Complying!” The Heightened Obligation Lawyers Have to Ensure Clients
Follow Court Orders in Litigation Matters, 2 SHIDLER J.L. COMM. & TECH. 9, 14 (2005)
(noting lawyer’s obligation of speaking with “key player[s]” involved in litigation).
75. See Logtale, Ltd. v. IKOR, Inc., 2013 WL 3967750 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) (noting that counsel had not been “sufficiently proactive in ensuring that his clients are conducting thorough and appropriate document searches, especially in light of obvious gaps
and underproduction;” it is “not enough for counsel to simply give instructions to his clients and count on them to fulfill their discovery obligations;” additionally suggesting
that, if there were “continuing problems,” court would order party to retain an e-discovery
vendor and submit “detailed declarations” regarding discovery efforts).
76. See Lauren Katz, A Balancing Act: Ethical Dilemmas in Retaining E-Discovery
Consultants, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 929, 940-41 (2009) (to fulfill duty of competence,
attorneys may need to obtain assistance of e-discovery consultants); see also Sedona Conf.
WGI, supra note 39 (“Parties should perform due diligence in choosing a particular information retrieval product or service from a vendor.”). Wholesale delegation to a vendor of
responsibility for the e-discovery process could be dangerous. See Peerless Indus., Inc. v.
Crimson AV, LLC, 2013 WL 85378 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2013) (granting sanctions based on
party’s “backseat approach” of reliance on vendor to accomplish collection; defendant ordered to “show that they in fact searched” for the requested documents).
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particular case.77 Courts will rarely tolerate willful ignorance on these
subjects.78 Counsel, moreover, should develop at least a rough familiarity with the norms of e-discovery project management, especially the
budgeting elements of such projects.79 Education in the area of information management practices and litigation preparedness may also
improve the efficiency of e-discovery projects,80 aid in litigation
77. See Oot, Kershaw, & Roitblat, supra note 40 (“Many lawyers and judges need
education regarding ‘reasonable inquiry’ discovery response techniques.”).
78. See Clay v. Consol. Pa. Coal Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129809, at *4 (N.D. W.
Va. Aug. 13, 2013) (ordering sanctions where claims of “miscommunication” between
counsel and client, coupled with mistaken “assumption” that searches would occur, suggested “suspicious course” and “severe shortcoming” in discovery process); 1100 West,
LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., 2009 WL 1605118, at *28 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 2009)
(sanctioning counsel for failure to supervise client’s search, and misrepresentations about
client information); Diabetes Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. HealthPia Am. Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8362 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2008) (discussing that counsel was “remiss” for entrusting
search for responsive e-mails to junior associate, not provided with direction or instruction for crafting keyword search); Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., 2006 WL
1409413, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (stating that counsel was “grossly negligent” for
“simply accept[ing]” client’s representations about lack of computers to search); see also
Scott Giordano, Five Steps to Regaining E-Discovery Control in the Era of Big Data, KM
WORLD (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/Editorial/ViewPoints/Five-Stepsto-Regaining-E-Discovery-Control-in-the-Era-of-Big-Data-88159.aspx (the “vast majority”
of judicial sanctions in e-discovery matters involve “poor coordination among e-discovery
team members”); Daniel Gelb, Understanding E-Discovery Obligations before Making a
Certification, 7 DIGITAL DISC. & E-EVID. 214, 215 (2007) (certification requirement prohibits an attorney from “willfully blind” representation that a discovery response is complete); but see Thomas Y. Allman, Achieving an Appropriate Balance: The Use of Counsel
Sanctions in Connection with the Resolution of E-Discovery Misconduct, 15 RICH. J. L. &
TECH. 9, 22 (2009) (“Some courts, unfortunately, treat outside counsel as virtual guarantors of discovery diligence and see very little room for reliance on client resources.”). At
least one court, in a pilot project, requires the presence of knowledgeable counsel at conferences concerning e-discovery. See In re Pilot Project Regarding Case Mgmt. Techniques for Complex Civil Cases in the S. Dist. of N.Y., No. 11 Misc. 00388 (order requiring, in complex cases chosen for pilot project, Rule 26(f) conference with counsel
“sufficiently knowledgeable” of e-discovery matters relating to their clients’ technological
systems to discuss potentially relevant data, data system capabilities, and keyword lists
and responsiveness rates).
79. See David Horrigan & Alan Pelz-Sharpe, supra note 55 (“lawyers often receive
huge e-discovery bills with massive cost overruns, but know little about what went into
the costs, leaving them unable to question the bill intelligently”); David Degnan, supra
note 21, at 153 (noting that data processing charges for service vendors may include an
array of services, some of which can be performed by the corporation itself, if properly
staffed and equipped).
80. See Mitchell Dembin & Philip Favro, supra note 68. “If a goal of in-house counsel is to obtain more cost-effective results in discovery, then it behooves counsel to examine the organization’s information governance plan. The time to conduct this examination
is not in the crisis atmosphere of complex litigation[.]” Id.; Esteban, supra note 54, at 26
(“Companies are taking a hard look at their records retention and management policies to
balance the need to preserve data for regulatory or litigation requirements with the costs
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budgeting,81 and help parties and counsel avoid allegations of bad
faith.82
B. GOOD FAITH
Civil procedure rules do not specifically “describe the lengths” to
which a litigant must go in conducting a reasonable search for information.83 Yet, “halfhearted and ineffective” efforts are clearly inadequate;84 a “good faith” effort is essential. 85 One common phenomenon,
of preservation and, later in a litigation cycle, collection and production.”); Connie Brenton, E-discovery: What is the Optimal Model for Corporations?, INSIDE COUNS. (Nov. 22,
2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/11/22/e-discovery-what-is-the-optimal-modelfor-corporat (“Corporations that have put in place well-defined e-discovery processes have
dramatically increased their litigation discovery effectiveness, reduced their risk and
saved tens of millions of dollars in the bargain.”); Herbert Roitblat, A Systems Approach to
E-Discovery,
LAW
TECH.
NEWS
(Nov.
6,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202626658605/A-Systems-Approach-to-EDiscovery (suggesting that “fragmented” information systems may adversely affect cost
and consistency of search; records management, information lifecycle management and
information governance systems, implemented prior to litigation, may improve efficiency);
Matthew A. Bills, 9 Ways to Reduce E-discovery Costs, CORP. COUNS. 1, 1 (Sept. 6, 2013),
available
at
http://www.grippoelden.com/media/news/4_9%20Ways%20to%20Redu
ce%20E-discovery%20Costs.pdf (suggesting need to “implement a sound recordsmanagement policy” as means to reduce costs); see also Victor Li, Georgetown 2013: Building a Better Info Governance Practice, LAW TECH. NEWS (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202629213326 (suggesting that “defensible” deletion policies, combined with technology assisted review, can reduce volume of documents
reviewed by up to forty percent) (citing Tim Hart at McKesson Corp.).
81. See D. Casey Flaherty, Standardizing E-Discovery Cost Redux, LAW TECH.
NEWS
(Dec.
17,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1387234094772/Standardizing-E-Discovery-CostRedux (“unless you are intimately familiar with your data, you are going to have a very
hard time determining ex ante (before the event) what your costs will be”).
82. See generally Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc. v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 2012 WL
1852048 (D. Neb. May 18, 2012) (ordering monetary sanctions and payment for a forensic
search where “Defendants’ essentially non-existent document retention policy” and “disorganized method of storing the documents they do keep” rendered them “an unreliable
source of discovery,” necessitating forensic search).
83. See Benson v. Sanford Health, 2011 WL 1135379, at *4 (D.S.D. Mar. 25, 2011).
84. See Robinson v. City of Arkansas City, Kansas, 2012 WL 603576, at *4 (D. Kan.
Feb. 24, 2012); see also Northstar Marine, Inc. v. Huffman, CA 13-00037-WS-C (S.D. Ala.
Aug. 27, 2013) (where parties agreed in Rule 26(f) report to use “computer-assisted search
technology,” the excuse that a party could not find an “inexpensive provider” of search
technology did not suffice; “no showing of due diligence or good cause” to modify agreed
order); Maggette v. BL Dev. Corp., 2009 WL 4346062, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 24, 2009)
(stating that sanctions were appropriate for “casual, if not arrogant, rebuff to plaintiffs’
repeated efforts to obtain information which is ordinarily easily produced in litigation”); R
& R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 251 F.R.D. 520, 525 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (sanctions for
failure to produce electronic claim log after repeated requests; where employee who certified claim log did not exist later produced it from his own computer).
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for example, is the “drive by” Rule 26(f) conference. 86 Early engagement
on every conceivable e-discovery issue may be neither possible nor desirable;87 yet, counsel surely cannot avoid their “meet and confer” obligations merely as a matter of gamesmanship,88 and surely cannot ignore court directions regarding cooperation.89
“Sand-bagging”
85. See Tayadon v. Geyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 WL 2048257 (D.D.C. June 6, 2012)
(ordering parties to make “genuine efforts to engage” in “cooperative discovery regime,”
and requiring periodic court tele-conferences to confirm progress); In re Sept. 11th Liab.
Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Discovery is run largely by
attorneys, and a court and the judicial process depend upon honesty and fair dealing
among attorneys.”); see also Sedona Conf. WGI, supra note 39, at 195 (“Parties should
make a good faith attempt to collaborate on the use of particular search and information
retrieval methods, tools and protocols (including keywords, concepts, and other types of
search parameters).”).
86. Lee H. Rosenthal, Electronic Discovery – Is the System Broken? Can it be Fixed?,
THE ADVOCATE 8, 9 (Summer 2010) (noting FJC study, indicating that only half of attorney respondents included discussion of ESI in Rule 26(f) conferences, and only one in five
court-ordered discovery plans included provisions relating to ESI); see also Michael Collyard, E-Discovery: Avoiding Drive By “Meet & Confers,” INSIDE COUNS. (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/09/13/e-discovery-avoiding-drive-by-meet-confers.
87. See H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Are Meet, Confer Efforts Doing
More
Harm
Than
Good?,
N.Y.
L.J.
(July
31,
2012),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202564932130/Are-Meet,-Confer-Efforts-DoingMore-Harm-Than-Good%3F (“Ideally, parties will engage on key e-discovery and preservation issues when and if the need arises.”); Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery after December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 176 (2006)
(“Every item on this daunting [Rule 26(f)] list may not apply or be important in every
case.”).
88. See Branhaven LLC v. Beeftek, Inc., 2013 WL 388429 (D. Md. Jan. 4, 2013) (ordering sanctions for wrongful Rule 26(g) certification, where counsel “essentially admitted” that discovery response was “meaningless” and intended to “buy time;” noting that
“[i]f all counsel operated at this level of disinterest as to discovery obligations, chaos
would ensue”); Lane v. Page, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21198, at *12 (D. N.M. Feb. 10, 2011)
(noting that the Federal Rules “exhibit little patience for gamesmanship”); Jimena v. UBS
AG Bank, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119393, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (stating
that the Federal Rules are “meant to encourage fairness and to avoid obstructionism,
gamesmanship, and tactical maneuvering”); cf. Cache La Poudre Fees, LLC v. Land O
Lakes, Inc., 2007 WL 6840001, at *24 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007) (“bad faith” occurs where
counsel is “not merely negligent, but has engaged in some wrongdoing” or has “some motive of self-interest”). The circumstances of a case (including prior instances of improper
behavior) might also suggest bad faith. Id.; see Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239,
246 (1st Cir. 1992) (court may consider “all the circumstances” surrounding “lapses” in
discovery, including “events which did not occur in the case proper but occurred in other
cases,” which may indicate “counsel’s proven propensities”).
89. See EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., Inc., 2013 WL 752912, at *3
(D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2013) (noting court’s “broad discretion” to “insure not only that lawyers
and parties refrain from contumacious behavior, . . . but that they fulfill their high duty to
insure the expeditious and sound management of the preparation of cases for trial”); see
id. at *1 (imposing sanctions for party “negligent in its discovery obligations, dilatory in
cooperating with defense counsel, and somewhat cavalier in its responsibility” to the
court).
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exchanges of information (in hopes that the opposing party will somehow stumble) also typically receives a frigid judicial response.90
Similarly, self-created problems in production of information generally
do not serve as adequate excuses for incompleteness of response.91
The good faith obligation applies in both directions. 92 Blunderbuss
discovery requests,93 followed by take-no-prisoners refusal to recognize
priorities in discovery,94 fail the bad faith standard for requesting
90. See In re Nat’l Assoc. of Music Merchants, Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL 6372826, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2011) (denying request to research database, where plaintiff had “ample opportunity” to obtain the information
through prior discovery, but failed to take advantage of “meet and confer” process; but
permitting additional, limited search to extent requesting party willing to pay cost); Covad Comm. Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 147, 149 (D.D.C. 2008) (failure of party to respond to an invitation to propose search terms is not the kind of “collaboration and cooperation” expected by courts and it is a “waste of judicial resources to continue to split
hairs on an issue that should disappear when lawyers start abiding by their obligations”
to confer); see also In re Biomet M2A Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12MD-2391 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2013) (where responding party offered to permit plaintiffs to
suggest additional search terms, and plaintiffs declined, responding party not required to
start search over, where “confidence tests” suggested a “comparatively modest number” of
additional documents would be found); In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650,
651, 662 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (where party “undertook the [search] task in secret,” party
failed to work in “cooperative” manner).
91. See Sedona Conf., supra note 15, at 298 (in assessing whether discovery request
is unduly burdensome, a court should consider the extent to which the claimed burden
“grow[s] out of the responding party’s action or inaction”); see also Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122165, at *16-17 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011) (where party
“creates its own burden or expense” by converting data into an inaccessible format, it
should not be entitled to shift costs of search); Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS, 116427, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011) (rejecting burden concern as “self-inflicted
to a large extent”).
92. See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 365 F. Supp. 975, 982
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (“grossly improper” for plaintiff to “set out a dragnet” against a large
number of parties “to the inconvenience, expense and possible anxiety of being sued,”
without “reasonable investigation” in advance of filing).
93. See Woodward v. Emulex Corp., 714 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that
trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting discovery to specifically named employees and thereby prevent “a fishing expedition into possibly barren waters”); Georgacarakos v. Wiley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26900, at *16 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2011) (magistrate
judge properly exercised authority to “overlook matters of form and cut to the heart of a
discovery dispute” by modification of overbroad document request); see also Craig Ball,
Modern
E-Discovery
Requests,
LAW
TECH.
NEWS
(Dec.
1,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202630112765/Modern-E-Discovery-Requests
(suggesting that “[s]lipshod requests for production” of ESI “sow the seeds for failed discovery;” and suggesting need to overcome “challenges” in requesting information by
“ditch[ing] the boilerplate” and “focusing on what we really are seeking—information in
utile and complete forms”).
94. See Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at
*40 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) (“The court is left with the impression that counsel are searching for discovery disputes, rather than working cooperatively[.]”).
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parties.95 Broad-based demands for free access to a responding party’s
computer systems also typically fail, absent a significant showing of
need.96
C. PLAN FORMULATION
The American system of civil justice generally depends upon a party-driven pre-trial process.97 Whether generated purely by the responding party,98 or as the product of negotiations between the parties, courts
expect genuine efforts to formulate a discovery plan, 99 rather than
95. See Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63803,
at *1-7 (D. Colo. June 15, 2011) (rejecting request for production of every recorded sales
call in database, where review of calls would require four years to identify potentially responsive information); Willner v. Sybase, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121658, at *9 (S.D. Idaho
Nov. 16, 2010) (search of employee emails would amount to “proverbial fishing expedition—an exploration of a sea of information with scarcely more than a hope that it will
yield evidence to support a plausible claim;” in employing “proportionality standard,”
court must balance requesting party’s interest against “not-inconsequential burden of
searching for and producing documents”); Murray v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33236, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010) (stating that it is “not the Court’s task” to do a party’s “job for him by redrafting his manifestly overbroad discovery requests”).
96. See NOLA Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enterp., Inc., 2013 WL 3974535, at *1
(E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2013) (rejecting “ultra-broad” request for passwords to permit defendant
to “roam freely through all manner of personal and financial data” on websites; noting
that “mere skepticism” that opposing party has not produced all relevant information was
insufficient to justify drastic discovery measures); Giachetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union
Free Schl. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting “unfettered access” to social network information, but requiring production of any “specific references” to emotional distress that plaintiff claimed); Tucker v. AIG, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 85, 90 (D. Conn. 2012)
(request for “carte blanche access to rummage through” mirror images of laptops in effect
seeks to “dredge an ocean” in effort to “capture a few elusive, perhaps non-existent, fish”).
97. See Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 145, 162 (2012) (“We are willing to allow wide attorney discretion in conducting
pretrial activities because such discretion is the best mechanism we have to promote the
ultimate goals (the core values) of a predictable, efficient, and fair resolution of the merits.”); but see Terry Ahearn & Wendy Axelrod, E-Discovery: Cooperation and Proportionality, the Past, Present and Future, INSIDE COUNS. (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/09/24/e-discovery-cooperation-and-proportionality-thepa (suggesting that “judicial, instead of party, management of discovery has become the
norm and voluntary party cooperation often the exception”).
98. Where the requesting party refuses to cooperate in formulating a search plan,
the responding party may have no choice but to proceed with its own plan. Absent that
situation, however, courts generally disfavor a “unilateral decision” regarding search. See
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (unilateral decision fails to heed call for “cooperation concerning e-discovery”).
99. See, e.g., Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“counsel must design an appropriate process, including use of available technology, with
appropriate quality control testing”); William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mftrs.
Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting “need for careful thought, quality
control, testing, and cooperation to avoid searches in the dark, by the seat of the pants”).
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simply dumping the matter in a judge’s lap. 100 Indeed, some courts
have imposed sanctions,101 and expressed remarkable annoyance at
parties who manage to bicker over every element of discovery. 102 Even
if the discovery plan is incomplete, or meant to evolve over time,103
courts greatly appreciate efforts to structure the discovery process, 104
100. See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (stating that
the court “expects counsel to ‘reach practical agreement’ without the court having to micro-manage e-discovery,” including agreement on “search terms, date ranges, key players”
and “any other essential details about the search methodology”); SEC v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (had discovery plan been created by meet and
confer process, “the Court might not now be required to intervene”); Victor Stanley, Inc. v.
Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D. Md. 2008) (“Selection of the appropriate
search and information retrieval technique requires careful advance planning by persons
qualified to design effective search methodologies.”).
101. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 911 F.Supp.2d
340 (E.D. Va. 2012) (ordering payment of fees and costs for “Shermanesque” refusal to
cooperate); Innospan Corp. v. Intuit, Inc., 2012 WL 1144272 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2012)
(sanctions for “relentless discovery violations” and failure to cooperate); Taydon v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 WL 2048257 (D.D.C. June 6, 2012) (declaring “High Noon” for
failure to cooperate, and requiring bi-weekly telephone status conference with court to
report on progress and resolve any discovery disagreements); Aguilar v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“This lawsuit demonstrates why it is so important that parties fully discuss their ESI early in the evolution of a case. . . . [T]he parties might have been able to
work out many, if not all, of their differences[;]” “[i]nstead, these proceeding have now
been bogged down in expensive and time-consuming litigation of electronic discovery issues[.]”).
102. See, e.g., Patroski v. Pressley Ridge, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133290, at *8 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 17, 2011) (not court’s responsibility to “referee discovery bouts between consenting adults”); Morris v. Coker, 2011 WL 3847590, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011) (court
invites lawyers to “kindergarten party” to deal with discovery bickering); Avista Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 6:05-cv-1430-Orl-31JGG, (M.D. Fla. June 7,
2006), available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/07/magazines/fortune/judgerps_fortune/
(court orders attorneys to play game of “rock, paper, scissors” on courthouse steps to resolve one of continuing discovery disputes).
103. See In re Facebook PPC Advert. Litig., 2011 WL 1324516, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
6, 2011) (“the argument that an ESI Protocol cannot address every single issue that may
arise is not an argument to have no ESI Protocol at all”); see also Jamie Brown & Paul
Weiner, Data Handling Strategies for Smaller Cases—A Checklist (2013), available at
www.law.georgetown.edu (suggesting “phased collection,” with “narrow time frame” and
use of “primary sources” to start, as means of controlling costs); Bills, supra note 80 (“conducting discovery in phases is an effective way to reduce costs by focusing the parties’
time and effort on the most critical discovery at the outset”); Sean R. Gallagher, Bringing
Proportionality back into the Discovery Process: E-Discovery for the other 97% of Us,
A.B.A.
1,
11
(Apr.
23,
2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2013/04/aba_national_sym
posiumontechnologyinlaboremploymentlaw/17_gallagher.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting
need for “front-loading certain aspects” of discovery for early stages, such as to permit
“clarification of the magnitude of the claims,” so that parties may later be “better positioned to target future discovery in a more efficient manner”).
104. See Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (“desirable” that “proposals
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and sharpen any issues that require judicial resolution. 105 Courts especially dislike forced choices between botched discovery efforts (already
undertaken) and repeated (wasteful) palliative efforts.106
In more complicated matters, involving specialized search technologies, the development of such a plan, by the parties rather than by the
court, may be particularly essential.107 Where necessary, at least in the
preliminary phases of discovery plan formulation, the parties may prefer to operate under protection of a confidentiality stipulation and order.108 In some cases, early involvement of a mediator or special master
regarding discovery be developed through a process where [parties] meet in person, informally exploring the nature and basis of the issues, and discuss how discovery can be
conducted most efficiently and economically”).
105. See Ahearn & Axelrod, supra note 97 (suggesting the desirability of “jointly
submitted document production or ESI protocol,” which will “clearly define [party] mutual
discovery obligations” and “frame the issues upfront”).
106. See, e.g., Kleen Prods., LLC v. Pkg. Corp. of Am., 2012 WL 4498465 139632, at
*46 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (cooperation “should be started early in the case;” it is “difficult or impossible to unwind procedures that have already been implemented”); Nat’l Day
Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency, 877 F.
Supp.2d 87, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“repeating vast swaths of the search in order to ensure
adequacy is a waste of resources” and ordering parties to “work cooperatively” to design
additional, targeted searches); Larsen v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp., 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12901, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) (rejecting request to redo production on
assertion of only “a few alleged discrepancies”); High Voltage Beverages, LLC v. CocaCola Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88259, at *5-6 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2009) (requiring party
to “sift sand for documents it has already produced would be unreasonably duplicative of
earlier efforts;” noting “unrebutted showing that the man-hours and expense of reviewing
the collection would be extraordinary, and it appears to the court that the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). The court stated in Ford
Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties, Inc.:
It is beyond cavil that this entire problem could have been avoided had there
been an explicit agreement between the parties as to production, but as that ship
has sailed, it is without question unduly burdensome to a party months after
production to require that party to reconstitute their entire production to appease
a late objection.
Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 426 (D.N.J. 2009); Gucci Am.,
Inc. v. Costco Whole Corp., 2003 WL 21018832, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2003) (responding
party “waited until the end of discovery, after the issue was brought before the Court, to
conduct a thorough search”).
107. See Sedona Conf. WGI, supra note 39 (“Success in using any automated search
method or technology will be enhanced by a well-thought out process with substantial
human input on the front end[.]”); see also Gordon v. Kaleida Health, 2013 WL 2250579
(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (need for parties to “meet and confer” regarding protocol for predictive coding); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 6:11-MD-2299
(W.D. La. July 27, 2012) (order detailing methods for technology assisted review in case;
noting need for “cooperation” in implementation of order); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative
Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D. Md. 2008) (“the party selecting the [search] methodology must be prepared to explain the rationale for the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly implemented”).
108. See Butterfield, Crowley, & Kenney, supra note 27, at 14-15 (suggesting desira-
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may also advance the plan formulation process. 109
D. MEETING BURDENS
Courts generally assume that producing parties are in the best position to understand their own information storage and retrieval systems,110 and thus required (in the first instance) to create a plan for
conducting required searches for information (with an opportunity for
input by the requesting party).111 Where the requesting party makes a
bility of court order to effect that disclosure of search methodologies does not constitute
waiver of work-product protection or attorney-client privilege, and search terms will be
treated as highly confidential) (citing In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38909, at *31-32 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2006)); see also Steven C. Bennett, How
Can Courts Encourage Cooperation in Discovery?, 82 N.Y.S.B.A.J. 27, 29 (2010) (“Under
cover of settlement privilege, parties, counsel and their computer advisors might more
freely discuss the terms that can most effectively and efficiently retrieve the most relevant materials while minimizing the burden on the responding party. Indeed, such a system might encourage parties to share test results of various search alternatives and permit limited, targeted follow-up searches without the specter of claims of spoliation and
related discovery violations.”).
109. See Cannata v. Wyndham, 2012 WL 528224, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2012) (special master empowered to approve and limit search terms); AFSCME v. Ortho-McNeilJanssen Pharm., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135371, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010) (“If
the Parties are unable to resolve these matters within the time allotted, the Court may
require them to submit their discovery processes to a special master, with costs to be
borne by the parties.”); Equity Analytics LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.D.C.
2008) (expert used to certify choice of search terms); see also Marian Riedy, Suman Beros,
& Kim Sperduto, Mediated Investigative E-Discovery, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 79, 81 (2010)
(proposing mediation methodology for approval of search protocol); see generally Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
347, 353 (2008) (noting that authority of special masters includes “reviewing discovery
documents” and “settlement negotiations”).
110. See Harlow v. Sprint/Nextel Corp., No. 08-2222 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 2013) (responding party in “best position to establish” that it has “already produced” sufficient relevant data; directing parties to “work together in good faith and in a cooperative manner
toward the goal of narrowing the size of the production” as well as “the cost and time
needed to produce it”); Kleen Prods. LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632, at *18 (“responding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and techniques appropriate for preserving and producing their own” ESI); Victor Stanley, Inc. v.
Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 261 n.10 (D. Md. 2008) (producing party must demonstrate that search methodology is “appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly
implemented”); Ice Corp. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 2007 WL 1364984, at *6 (D. Kan.
May 9, 2007) (“burden is on the [producing] party to support its objections [to further discovery] with specificity and, where appropriate, with reference to affidavits and other evidence”); see also SEDONA CONF., supra note 8, at 38 (producing party generally in best position to select most appropriate methods for reviewing and producing ESI).
111. See Ruiz-Bueno v. Scott, 2013 WL 6055402, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2013). In
Ruiz-Bueno, the court stated:
What should have occurred here is that, either as part of the Rule 26(f) planning
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credible argument that the search technique fails, in some important
way, to capture relevant information, the responding party may be required to explain the reasonableness of its search methodology,112
including quality assurance,113 and (if necessary) demonstrate the unreasonableness of extending the search beyond the locations and techniques already proposed (or undertaken).114
process, or once it became apparent that a dispute was brewing over ESI, counsel
should have engaged in a collaborative effort to solve the problem. That effort
would require defendants’ counsel to state explicitly how the search was constructed or organized. Plaintiffs’ counsel would then have been given the chance
to provide suggestions about making the search more thorough. That does not
mean that all of plaintiffs’ suggestions would have to be followed, but it would
change the nature of the dispute from one about whether plaintiffs are entitled to
find out how defendants went about retrieving information to one about whether
those efforts were reasonable. That issue cannot be discussed intelligently either
between counsel or by the Court in the absence of shared information about the
nature of the search. Id.
112. See Sedona Conf. WGI, supra note 39, at 195 (“Parties should expect that their
choice of search methodology will need to be explained, either formally or informally, in
subsequent legal contexts (including depositions, evidentiary proceedings, and trials).”);
see also Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D. Md. 2008) (party “failed to demonstrate” that keyword search was “reasonable” where party “neither
identified the keywords selected nor the qualifications of the persons who selected them to
design a proper search; they failed to demonstrate that there was quality-assurance testing; and when their production was challenged” they “failed to carry their burden of explaining what they had done and why it was sufficient”). The record of negotiations between the parties, together with the specific methodology of the search protocol, may be a
center-piece of the presentation to the court. See Ashish S. Prasad, Problems and Solutions in Electronic Discovery, 11 DIGITAL DISC. & E-EVIDENCE 1, 5 (Jan. 6, 2011) (“documentation created throughout the [e-discovery] process will enable counsel to describe
with accuracy the actions that were taken” and provide an “excellent opportunity for the
organization to demonstrate its good faith and reasonable efforts”).
113. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130123, at *42
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012) (responding party “must use reasonable measures to validate
ESI collected from database systems to ensure completeness and accuracy of the data acquisition”); ClearOne Comm. v. Chaing, 2008 WL 920336, at *2 (D. Utah Apr. 1, 2008)
(approving search terms, but suggesting potential need to revisit list if “a surprisingly
small or unreasonably large number of documents” are identified as responsive); In re
Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 662 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“common sense dictates
that sampling and other quality assurance techniques must be employed to meet requirements of completeness”); see also Ralph Losey, An Elusive Dialogue On Legal Search:
Part Two—Hunger Games and Hybrid Multimodal Quality Controls, E-DISCOVERY TEAM
BLOG (Sept. 3, 2012), http://e-discoveryteam.com/2012/09/03/an-elusive-dialogue-on-legalsearch-part-two-hunger-games-and-hybrid-multimodal-quality-controls/ (suggesting need
for “multimodal” controls, using “a variety of quality assurance methods”); Oot, Kershaw
& Roitblat, supra note 40, at 558 (reasonableness assessment of search should require
litigant to “[e]xplain how what was done was sufficient;” “[s]how that it was reasonable
and why;” “[s]et forth the qualifications of the persons selected to design the search;”
“[c]arefully craft the appropriate keywords with input from the ESI’s custodians as to the
words and abbreviations they use;” and “[u]se quality control tests of the methodology to
assure accuracy in retrieval and the elimination of false positives”) (citations omitted).
114. In re Coventry Healthcare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 290 F.R.D. 471, 475 (D. Md. 2013)
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The response almost certainly will require some (at least rough) estimates regarding the effectiveness of the search performed (or proposed),115 versus the cost and effectiveness of the additional search
sought by the requesting party.116 Where the responding party is unprepared to make such a showing, protection from the request may be
denied, or the court may order some form of targeted additional discovery.117 The responding party therefore must be prepared to explain the
(“The party seeking to lessen the burden of responding to electronic discovery bears the
burden of particularly demonstrating that burden and of providing suggested alternatives
that reasonably accommodate the requesting party’s legitimate discovery needs.”) (quotation omitted); Kleen Prods., LLC v. Pkg. Corp. of Am., 2012 WL 4498465 139632, at *46
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (“a party must articulate and provide evidence of its burden”);
Stambler v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157125, at *36 (E.D. Tex. May 23,
2011) (burden of justifying non-production or reduced production “should properly fall” on
responding party); Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47620, at *10
(S.D. Ohio May 14, 2010) (“The party claiming that discovery is burdensome does have an
obligation to make that claim with specificity.”).
115. Compare Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, 790 F. Supp.2d 997, 1010 (D. Ariz.
May 4, 2011) (sanctions where “unreasonably narrow search,” using only plaintiff’s name
and escrow number, considered “inexcusable”); compare William A. Gross Constr. Assocs.,
Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins., Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 135 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2009) (criticizing
“seat of the pants” efforts by lawyers to construct search terms) with Conn. Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Scheib, 2013 WL 485846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) (proof of $121,000 required
to index, filter, and process additional information established that requests were “unduly
burdensome”); Velocity Press v. Key Bank, 2011 WL 1584720, at *3 (D. Utah Apr. 26,
2011) (details furnished to court as to search terms and search method showed “reasonable” investigation).
116. See Ralph Losey, Good, Better, Best: A Tale of Three Proportionality Cases—Part
Two,
E-DISCOVERY
TEAM
BLOG
(Apr.
15,
2012),
http://ediscoveryteam.com/2012/04/15/good-better-best-a-tale-of-three-proportionality-cases-parttwo/ (suggesting that “basic metrics be shared on proposed keywords,” to provide “enough
disclosure so that the keyword picks are not blind”).
117. See Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. CIV. P. 26. The Committee Notes provide as follows:
[T]he parties may need some focused discovery, which may include sampling of
the sources, to learn more about what burdens and costs are involved in accessing the information, what the information consists of, and how valuable it is for
the litigation in light of information that can be obtained by exhausting other opportunities for discovery.
Id.; Sedona Conf., supra note 15, at 291. The Sedona Conference states:
When asked to limit discovery on the basis of burden or expense, courts must
make an assessment of the importance of the information sought. . . . In some
cases, it may be clear that the information requested is important—perhaps even
outcome-determinative. In other cases, courts order sampling of the requested
information, consider extrinsic evidence, or both, to determine whether the requested information is sufficiently important to warrant potentially burdensome
or expensive discovery.
Id.; see also Gallagher, supra note 103. In the article, Gallagher states:
More often than not, the court and the litigants are not in a position at the beginning of the case to identify all potential discovery disputes or assess the importance of certain information. . . . Sampling is one tool that can be used by the
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reasonableness of its chosen search protocol to the court, 118 and must be
prepared for the possibility that the court will require education on the
details of the technical processes involved in the search.119
VII. CONCLUSION
Clients and counsel involved in e-discovery deserve the certainty
and efficiency that a relatively clear standard for “reasonable” search
might provide.120 Some efforts at drafting technical standards are
parties to determine the importance and uniqueness of the information sought.
Id.; Craig Ball, Eight Tips to Quash the Cost of E-Discovery, BALL IN YOUR CT. BLOG (Mar.
21, 2013), http://ballinyourcourt.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/eight-tips-to-quash-the-cost-ofe-discovery/ (“Staggering sums are spent in e-discovery to collect and review data that
would never have been collected if only someone had run a small scale test before deploying an enterprise search.”).
118. Such an explanation need not, necessarily, involve revelation of work product or
attorney-client discussions. See Ruiz-Bueno v. Scott, 2013 WL 6055402, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 15, 2013) (noting “vast difference between describing, factually, what a party has
done to comply with a document request, and revealing discussions between counsel and
the client about that process”).
119. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 231 (“Application of the ‘reasonableness’ standard
in the context of a technology-assisted e-discovery process invariably will present the
court with methodologies or forensic techniques which are beyond the knowledge or skills
of a layperson, and certainly outside the experience of most judges.”). In Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves may not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find.
A magistrate supervising discovery does not—cannot—know the expected
productivity of a given request, because the nature of the requester’s claim and
the contents of the files (or head) of the adverse party are unknown.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007); Eurand, Inc. v. Myland
Pharm., Inc., 266 F.R.D. 79, 84 (D. Del. 2010) (“Neither lawyers nor judges are generally
qualified to opine that certain search terms or files are more or less likely to produce information than those keywords or data actually used or reviewed.”); Equity Analytics,
LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that “lawyers state as facts
what are actually highly debatable propositions as to the efficacy of various methods used
to search” ESI). In United States v. Farlow, the court stated:
Even the most computer literate of judges would struggle to know what protocol is appropriate in any individual case, and the notion that a busy trial judge is going to be
able to invent one out of whole cloth or to understand whether the proposed protocol
meets ill-defined technical search standards seems unrealistic.
United States v. Farlow, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009).
120. See D. Casey Flaherty, E-Discovery Costs Prediction: It’s Time to Share, LAW
TECH. NEWS (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202614976472/EDiscovery-Costs-Prediction%3A-It's-Time-to-Share (“Standardizing a method for comparing EDD vendor cost projections is long past due. . . . [T]he centralizing forces in ediscovery [such as Sedona and EDRM] need to assume responsibility for creating and
maintaining a universally recognized tool” for budget calculation). Oot, Kershaw, & Roitblat, supra note 40 (“Measurement against an accepted standard is essential to evaluating reasonableness.”).
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underway.121 Yet, the development of consistent, reliable metrics and
generally accepted quality criteria, at present, eludes the e-discovery
field.122 Courts, confronted with an absence of uniform performance
standards, tend to focus on fairness of process, versus the
reasonableness of predicted outcomes.123 This state of play may persist
for the foreseeable future, especially as the e-discovery market remains
fragmented.124 For practitioners and in-house counsel, at this point,
education, good faith efforts at cooperation, early discovery plan formulation, and focus on demonstrating the true needs of the case, versus
best estimates of cost, offer at least some hope of avoiding judicial ire.

121. The International Standards Organization (“ISO”), for one, has initiated a
standards-setting process. See Matt Nelson, Flying under the Radar: Proposed International
E-Discovery
Standard,
INSIDE
COUNS.
(Oct.
24,
2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/10/24/flying-under-the-radar-proposed-internationale-di. The draft ISO standard (not yet published) appears to focus principally on terminology and process. See Stephen Tepler, International Standard Project for E-Discovery Approved,
LAW
TECH.
NEWS
(Apr.
30,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202597948357. The standard may, however, include guidance from sources such as the Sedona Conference. See ISO Moves Forward on
E-Discovery
Standard,
ARMA
INT’L
(May
22,
2013),
http://www.arma.org/r1/news/newswire/2013/05/22/iso-moves-forward-on-e-discoverystandard. For updates on the ISO standard, see www.iso.org.
122. See Bruce Hedin, Dan Brassil, & Christopher Hogan, Toward a Meaningful EDiscovery
Standard
1,
1-7
(June
14,
2013),
available
at
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi5/additional/Hedin.pdf (suggesting that e-discovery
standard cannot be developed unless it answers question of “how accurate” the search results will be); see also Sedona Conf., supra note 12 (reasonableness of party’s discovery
process “must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the context of the value and importance of the matters in dispute, and no single practice, process or quality-checking
measure should be assumed to be appropriate in any and all circumstances”).
123.
See Ralph Losey, Secrets of Search—Part II, E-DISCOVERY TEAM BLOG (Dec. 18,
2011), http://e-discoveryteam.com/2011/12/29/secrets-of-search-part-iii/ (suggesting that
standards for review should include “quality tech[nology] assisted review,” “[d]irect supervision and feedback by the responsible lawyers(s) (merits counsel),” “[e]xperienced,
well motivated human reviewers,” “[h]ighly skilled project managers,” and “[s]trategic
cooperation between opposing counsel,” among other factors).
124. The U.S. e-discovery market includes hundreds of participants. A few dozen offer a national presence with a broad range of services. The remainder includes smaller,
regional providers, and providers of specialty e-discovery services. Finally, a number of
law firms, corporations, and government entities perform at least a portion of their ediscovery services “in-house.” See Evan Koblentz, Gartner Forecasts E-Discovery Growth
to
$2.9
Billion
in
2017,
LAW
TECH.
NEWS
(Jan.
3,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202583045089/Gartner-Forecasts-E-DiscoveryGrowth-to-$2.9-Billion-in-2017.
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